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I was a student of architecture long before I became a student of the visual arts.
Last year, an exhibition titled ‘Frank Gehry, Architect’ at the Solomon R. Guggenheim
Museum, New York, offered welcome evidence that the two disciplines are not far afield
from each other.

I would argue—and so did this exhibition—that they are in fact

contiguous practises within a shared domain of knowledge construction. Or at very least
they are aligned and correlated in my own mind and educational experience. Gehry has
become internationally renowned because the combination of a unique architectural
vocabulary, an iconoclastic use of materials, a penchant for collaborations with
contemporary artists, and an idiosyncratic approach to the design process and the
development of form have all come together as an integrated aesthetic ‘sensibility that
melds architecture and sculpture in exuberant buildings’ (From wall bio at Guggenheim
exhibition, installed May 18th – August 26, 2001).
I have to admit that a large part of what drew me to this exhibition was the
prospect of satisfying my yen for viewing maps and models, the inordinate fixation to
know the underlying purpose beneath the façade which all former architecture students
are invariably left with.

(That, along with the incapacity to inhibit one’s use of

unrelentingly legible block lettering.) Purposeful coherence is of course one of the goals
of all maps and models. This is no less the case in Arthur D. Efland’s newly released Art
and Cognition: Integrating the Visual Arts in the Curriculum (2002). This new tome sets
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for itself the admirable task of coherently mapping variously situated theories of
cognition, and from an integration of those theories, modeling a rationale for the
necessary integration of arts learning in general education curriculum. As Efland builds
his thesis, each chapter closes with a brief examination of implications for education in
the arts, aesthetics or general education.
Efland’s effort stems from his belief that works of art require a particular rigour of
intellectual inquiry to make meaningful sense, and become of value to the learner first
and foremost because they are context-bound creations. Consequently, works of art may
be understood as personally relevant artifacts only when they are grasped holistically—in
their interconnectedness within the social settings couching each individual’s personal
experience. Through his definition of works of art as context-bound, Efland claims that
the task before the learner is to resituate these domain-specific bodies of knowledge over
to a position of personal relevance and interpretation and to find a cognitive strategy for
doing so. Or rather, it is the task of educators to facilitate such transferences from
context-boundedness to personal utility, aiding the learner’s creation of newer bodies and
boundaries of knowledge. Efland boldly takes us then to where the positivist bias in the
human sciences will not allow us to go—toward the proposition that reductivist and
scientific methodology is not ‘the only way to procure reliable knowledge’ (p. 5).
Efland’s aim draws upon an architectural metaphor: to ‘build a foundation for lifelong
learning inclusive of the arts’ (p. 6).
According to Efland’s thesis, this all becomes possible assuming that one pictures
the mind as more than a hierarchical repository of logical-scientific symbolic structures,
more than a socially situated field of enculturated symbols mediated by parents, peers,
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and knowledgeable adults. Rather, Efland portrays a mind flexible enough to employ
different strategies appropriate to the mastery of understanding in pre-packaged,
generalizable, and well-structured domains of knowledge as well as ill-structured, broad
and complexly fragmented arrays of knowledge—yet able to integrate the variety of
knowledge domains and arrays into coherent and purposeful maps and models of the
world.
Ultimately, the book purports the mind’s imagination to be the most flexible and
integrative of all the symbol-processing tools at our disposal, powerfully formative and
capable of ‘creating new ideas or images through the combination and reorganization of
previous experiences’ (p. 133). The imagination can acquire other cultural tools such as
language, mathematics and works of art and then utilize them in continually reshaping an
individual’s lifeworld in accommodation to the dispositions of the learner, also described
as the learner’s ‘habits of mind’ (p. 118). Learning and the creation of new knowledge
may thus be preceded by imaginative, even artistic, purpose and development.

Efland begins to make his case for linking artistic development more closely with
general cognitive development in Chapter 2 of his book, presenting an extensive account
of research strands in cognitive developmental theory as typified by the work of Jean
Piaget and Lev Semenovich Vygotsky. Both, in differing ways, advanced 20th century
psychological behaviourism and its basic stimulus-response cause-effect tenets.
Behaviourism was itself the response of cognitive psychologists to positivist demands for
purging metaphysical speculation from a more purely scientific study of the mind and its
behaviours. The core of behavioural orthodoxy is that ‘[o]nly objects or events may
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function as stimuli, and learning is determined by responses to such stimuli’ (p. 18).
Efland notes Bruner’s citation of the 1956 publication of Bloom’s Taxonomy of
Educational Objectives as the ‘mythical birthday’ of the cognitive revolution (p. 15).
Bloom’s Taxonomy established a cumulative hierarchy of cognitive domains
descending from the cognitive, to the affective, to the psychomotor. In educational
discourse since then, cognition has been associated with rational exercises in thinking
which have been researched far more extensively than affective subjects or psychomotor
embodiments. Language arts, mathematical competence, and logical-scientific reasoning
were viewed as the bailiwicks of the mind’s development.
Piaget established an invariantly sequenced step theory for cognitive
developmental studies that eschewed the onset of artistic development as an object of
research inquiry. According to Efland, whereas Piaget locates mind ‘in the brain of the
lone individual’ (p. 30) and its ability to assimilate and accommodate emerging schemas
or structures of knowledge, Vygotsky described cognitive development as part of an
interactive process of social learning between a mind and its sociocultural environment.
In Vygotskian theory, the brain internalizes the cultural influences that surround it;
individual cognitive development begins in a proximal zone outside of the brain through
symbol-driven tools, discursively mediated, serving as the stimulus for learning.
Within Bloom’s taxonomic delineation and most of its subsequent elaborations
throughout the course of the 20th century’s scientific and categorizing predisposition in
developmental psychological discourse, artistic and aesthetic thinking became relegated
to the affective category, not quite at the level of cognitive activity. This relegation was
conferred in spite of a range of arguments to the contrary, such as Rudolf Arnheim’s that
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‘visual perception is visual thinking and art making is a kind of visual problem solving’
(Parsons, 1998, p. 81), and Michael Parsons’ (1998) that the puzzle of how to recreate a
perception as ‘an image in the particular terms of [an art] medium’ makes the artist or the
child a ‘problem-solver’ (p. 81).

In Chapter 3, Efland traces the related emergence of three major traditions in
cognitive theory.

The symbol processing tradition assumed an objective reality

independent of the learner and negotiated by a mind that manifests itself in symbolizing
cognitive activity that construes an objective version of reality through which to know the
world outside of the mind’s operations, and processing that reality through logical
symbols. The sociocultural, or situated tradition assumed a socially constructed reality
including the learner and negotiated by a mind that manifests itself in social and
discursive interactions building conventionalized aspects of the world that simultaneously
embed within the mind to shape perception and thinking. The constructivist tradition
assumed a personally constructed reality idiosyncratic to the learner and negotiated by a
mind that manifests itself in wholly personalized strategies and agency in making
relevant meanings. In this chapter, Efland also lays the foundation for advancing his own
modified constructivist theory of learning through the arts, integrating the assumptions of
symbol processing and situatedness in development.

Chapter 4 begins Efland’s exploration of a theory of cognitive flexibility that
strategizes linkages between prior knowledge arrangements and new interpretable
encounters largely by the overlapping of sets of information, an analogy Efland borrows
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from urban planning.

Particularly useful is the discussion of learning and transfer

drawing upon ‘ill-structured’ and irregular arrays of knowledge, versus that which draws
upon ‘well-structured’ domains such as those encountered in textbooks and lectures.
Efland quotes Spiro, Feltovich, Coulson & Anderson’s (1988) work on the flexibility and
connectedness of knowledge acquisition and transfer in ill-structured learning contexts,
said to be more complex a task than approaching knowledge acquisition and transfer
from an overreliance in the neatly compartmentalized ‘pre-compiled’ schemas of wellstructured learning contexts (Efland, p. 97). Efland settles upon the ‘hub metaphor’
developed by Yang (2000) as likely to prove most influential to contemporary curriculum
development when navigating ill-structured arrays of knowledge. Efland writes:
If airlines scheduled direct flights between all of the cities they served, they would
soon be overwhelmed by the sheer complexity of the flight schedule they would
have to maintain. If certain cities were instituted as hubs or transfer points, the
scheduling system could be simplified and made less cumbersome by having
several planes, flying relatively short distances, meet at the same terminal to
exchange passengers. (p. 103)
Efland urges curriculum planners to adapt the hub metaphor toward integrating
areas of study and helping students ‘construct possible linkages among ideas often
isolated by arbitrary subject boundaries’ (p. 103). Moreover Efland is now implying the
utility of art educational models of curriculum planning to general educational practise.
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As Efland builds his own model of cognitive learning through the arts, Chapter 5
allots valuable square footage to a focus on the work of Judith Koroscik and her
associates. Koroscik’s research has focused on learning problems in the transfer of
knowledge from domain-specific contexts to coalesce within the framework of the
learner’s prior knowledge base. Throughout the book Efland does due diligence to
comparing and contrasting a crop of theories on learning in the arts, some historical, such
as by Bruner, Lowenfeld, Read, and Arnheim—some more contemporary, such as those
advanced by Gardner, Wolf, Parsons, Brent and Margary Wilson, Anna Kindler, and
Bernard Darras. But Chapter 5 belongs to Koroscik. The kernel that Efland seem to be
after is in Koroscik’s (1993) research into the differing strategies novices and experts use
in the expansion of their knowledge base, and the suggestion that works of art offer the
possibility of integrating knowledge ‘since their interpretations utilize knowledge about
the social and cultural landscape from which they came’ (Efland, p. 167). Efland’s point
is that through the arts, learners discover that irregular and ad hoc transferences between
a work of art and one’s lifeworld are both conceivable and tenable as an extension of
knowledge.
The centrality of transfer to Efland’s thesis leads to a lengthy discussion in
Chapter 6 on the importance of metaphoric and narrative constructions to the ‘higher end
of the spectrum of human cognitive performance’ (p. 152). Efland ultimately believes
that ‘metaphor is an essential component of imagination in such forms of cognition as
abstract reason’ (p. 152), imbuing learners with a leaping flexible-mindedness and
facility for the intussusception of both situated and embodied properties which, in their
rapprochement, establish connectivity across widely diverse human experience.

He
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presents a metaphoric imagination as a generator of strategies for the transfer of contextbound and domain-specific essentials over into the maps of personal understanding
constructed by a learner, thereby a cognitive tool making possible the architecture of
process models of reality and the enabling of abstract thought. Efland emphasizes that
the relevance of such a rationale for cognitive learning in and through the arts is yielded
in that, unlike in scientific discourse where the metaphors in use tend to remain hidden,
‘it is only in the arts where the processes and products of the imagination are
encountered and explored in full consciousness’ and become the objects of inquiry (p.
153, emphasis by author).

If one compares Efland’s integrationist thesis with Charles M. Dorn’s
developmental perspective in Mind in Art: Cognitive Foundations in Art Education
(1999), one comes away with the suspicion that Efland might find Dorn’s argument that
art in the curriculum must start with the making of art just a tad myopic. This is not to
denigrate Dorn’s argument, which is both valid and valuable. I simply note here that
Efland is more far-sighted. To Efland, a worthwhile curriculum in the arts is not one that
centres on the issue of transforming ideas into forms and images; to Efland, art
curriculum is about the transfer of situated experience into abstract ideas. In other words,
art is in the same business as science, though science understands it not. John C. Gilmour
(1986) has reached the conclusion that ‘our interpretive activities fall within a general
human intention to understand the world’ (p.152). Science interprets the natural world
and parses out its general laws; art also interprets the world, but seeks embody it as well,
in visuosymbolic, musical and material exemplars that narrate the human experience.
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But art also embodies the void…the gaps in our knowledge, our measurements,
and models. Coherence is vital to the well-being of human cognitive functioning; the
alternative is not long viable—semi-conscious awareness, nonsense, insanity, and the
paranoia of a world disintegrating into the unknowable—falling away into the void. The
metaphors of artistic endeavour draw upon these voids, making sense of them. At the
onset of cognitive operation, when almost all is unknown or unknowable, metaphoric
leaps of thought have always aided the development of mind and identity, proliferating
whole mental landscapes from the barest encounters and engagements with the world.
Repeated mining of this early cognitive real estate yields raw materials for knowledge
structures that will be replicated and recycled in mind, migrating to and fro, in refittings
and refurbishments from one knowledge enhancing event to another. Metaphors are
vehicles for these refittings and refurbishments, ‘minor works of art’, each crafted of a
keen utilitarian aesthetic (Danto, 1981 p.189). A mind can thus made, remade, unmade,
and made over; it is never finished. It has no certain form.
In an earlier exhibition catalog, The Architecture of Frank Gehry (1986), Gehry is
quoted as insisting that he likes best the ‘poetic’ appearance of unfinished buildings and
raw building materials, frameworks revealed. In an interview for American Architecture
Now, Gehry champions ‘the quality that you find in paintings by Jackson Pollock, for
instance, or de Kooning, or Cézanne, that look like the paint was just applied’ (cited in
Frank Gehry, Architect exhibition catalog, 2001, p. 311). Gehry believes in turning
unfinished materials into works of art and architecture.

He has practised the

transformation of the humdrum mappings of topological surveys and square footage
requirements into a continuing lattice of free-associative models derived of models, ‘free
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play ideas’ culminating in a large-scale and inhabitable model or ‘sketch’ that remarkably
retains the sense of being a work in progress.

Not relying upon conventional

architectural typology, Gehry seeks a freshness born not only of this process of
vernacular proliferation, but also out of the practise of dialogue and collaboration,
especially with other artists. In the process, Gehry has gone over to the use of new
tools—first sculpting multiple solutions out of sensuously provocative materials as
eclectic as wood, paper, adhesive tape, wax-infused velvet, glass, metal, plaster, chain
link, mylar, and epoxy-resin fiberglas—and then three-dimensionally digitizing and
rapidly prototyping fluid projections of these process models through powerful computeraided design (CAD) technology.

Gehry’s strategies produce sculpted architectural

frameworks that are, as a body of work, extraordinarily uncertain. It is the kind of
learning Efland has in mind.
Not relying upon conventional curriculum architecture, Efland seeks a fresh
approach to general education born of a process melding conventional learning exercises
with the sculptural sensibilities, the dialogic engagement of the senses and materials that
is inherent to aesthetic experience. Efland’s suggestions that educators utilize key works
of art as landmarks for cross-disciplinary and cross-social learning, that we recognize the
role of metaphor and narrative in providing the basis for ‘an imaginative reality’ (Lakoff
& Johnson, 1980, p. 193), and that we understand the purpose of the arts as contributive
to the embodiment of ‘the myths that bind human social systems together’ (p. 171), all
rise together to form new curricular indications implying ineffables vital to the
furtherance of the exercise of human development. It is the kind of bold integration
Gehry would be most happy to construct.

10

References
Danto, A. C. (1981). The transfiguration of the commonplace. (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press).
Efland, A. D. (2002). Art and cognition: Integrating the visual arts in the curriculum.
(New York: Teachers College Press & Reston, VA: National Art Education
Association).
Gilmour, J. C. (1986). Picturing the world. (New York: State University of New York
Press).
Koroscik, J. S. (1993). Learning in the visual arts: Implications for preparing art teachers.
Arts Education Policy Review, 94(5), 20-25.
Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. (Chicago & London: The
University of Chicago Press).
Parsons, M. (1998). [Review of Child development in art]. Studies in Art Education,
40(1), 80-91.
Ragheb, J. F. (ed) (2001). Frank Gehry, architect. (New York: Guggenheim Museum
Publications).
Spiro, R. J., Coulson, R. L., Feltovich, P. J., & Anderson, D. K. (1988). Cognitive
flexibility theory: Advanced knowledge acquisition in ill-structured domains.
(Tech. Rep. No. 441). University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Center for the
Study of Reading.
Yang, G. (2000). Exploration of Chinese art using a multimedia CD-ROM: Design,
mediated experience, and knowledge construction. Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbus, Ohio State University.
The architecture of Frank Gehry. (1986). Exh. cat. Essays by Rosemarie Haag Better,
Coosje van Bruggen, Mildred Friedman, Joseph Giovanni, Thomas S. Hines, Pilar
Viladis; commentary by Gehry. The Walker Art Center, Minneapolis, New York:
Rizzoli.

11

